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FINANCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY:
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by
M_RZ_ GOCQRRO H. GOCHOCO*
The large current and expected deficits (relative to
GNP) in western countries have given rise to a renewed
inter:est in macro-economic public flnar;ce. Topics such as
the effects of large def;cTts and their means of finance
pervade, the .journals. Open economy issues, such a.s export
"crowdin._g out" have become equally important In as much as
budget deficit.s such as those !r, the united states have,
until recently, been accompanied by f_assive capital inflows
and real exchange rate appreciation.
For developing countries, the manageabil ty of budget
deficits is etressed ir, the literature as a prerequisite
for the success of 1 i beral i zati on programs. The
experiences of the southern cone countries of Latin
America are often cited. McKinnon and Mathieson state,
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2"Thus the swing from deficit to surplus in
the true government accounts, where the
monetary system is appropriately consolidated
with the treasury accounts, is all the more
remarkable and was a necessary condition
for fully liberalizing the Chilean economy."t
Conversely,
"The lack of fiscal control should have
discouraged the Argentinian authorities from
proceeding with a full-scale financial
liberalization similar to the one undertaken
in Chile."2
As developing countries proceed with liberalization
schemes in their financial and trade affairs, it is
important to bear in mind that the outcome of such schemes
will be impinged by the size and .persistence of budget
deficits and the manner in which they are financed.
There has also been a revival of the invariance
proposition with respect to the manner of financing govern-
ment expenditure in the macro rational expectations lite-
rature [e.g. Barro (1974)]. Specifically, this neutrality
proposition holds that the presence of inter-generational
transfers allows the public to equate the current value of
the bonds with the present value of future tax liabilities
generated by the bonds. The :implication of this is that the
distinction between tax and bond financing is irrelevant.
1 McKinnon and Mathieson, 1981, p.2-
2 Ibid-
3In contrast,_ _raditional theory holds that the issue of
bonds raises .net wealth._which in turn raises consumption
and interest rates, "crowding out" private investment.
Indeed, numerous empirical studies have examined the
degree of "crowding out". In addition., monetization of
government debt is looked upon as mitigating the effects on
real interestl rates and hence, the "crowding out" effect.
Friedman, for example, posits that the. expansionary
effects of government spending arise from the expansion in
the money supply used to finance such expenditures._
In general, therefore, the government can finance its
deficit by issuing bonds (which implies future taxes)_ or
levying taxes. Both methods of finance are within the
realm of fiscal policy. EQually important, however, is the
proposition of bonds that end up in the hands of the
public. This lies within the realm of monetary policy.
Kochin (1974, p.388), however, views money financing of the
deficit as a form of excise tax on existing money balances
if printing money leads to an increase in the price level.
Money financing of the deficit can also be looked upon as
increasing the demand debt of the government to be
financed by a rise in the future rate of excise taxation on
bank balances.
3 It has been recognized in the literature that even a
bond-financed increase in government spendin.9 will have to
be aonetized at some point. This is because the interest
payments on the bonds increase the size of the deficit over
time. Pure bond financing of the deficit is infeasible
because of its inherent instability.
4If money is neutral, as in the rational expectations
paradigm, then there is no long-run relationship between•
money growth and real variables. Money is not only
irrelevant from the point of view of financing deficits,
but monetary .policy is ineffective.
The validity of the different perspectives on the
financing of budget deficits and, specifically on whether
"crowding out '_ exists, can be tested empi.rically. Note
however, that in the case of developing countries, the
measure of "crowding out" will depend on whether
financial markets have been liberalized •or not. Under a
regime, with ceilings on .interest rates, the degree of
"crowding out" is partly captured by the degree to which
private sector demand for credit is unsatisfied as a result
of government borrowing although excess demand for credit
may, of course, exist even without government debt
financing•. Under a regime, of liberalized financial markets,
the degree of "crowding out" may be measured by 'the degree
to which interest rates rise in response to the financing
of the deficit rather than by other market factors which
raise•interest rates. While numerous •empirical studies of
the "crowding out'i effect exist for developed countries _,
there is a dearth of literature for developing .countries.
This study is divided into two sections. The first
attempts to determine whether there is a rule for financing
public debt that the public can discern. If there is, then
5presumably, bonds are. not part of .net wealth.aince .ithe
public can see .the future taxes .implicit in them. The
public saves an amount equal to the present value_of future
taxes .and an ex-ante "crowding out" effect occurs. .If there
is no discernible rule for financing, public debt, t.hen such
bond 1_sues can be perceived as adding, to the public's net
wealth, raising consumption and interest rates.-...via the
traditional "crowdin_..out" effect.
..
The second section is a natural consequence of the
first in that having determined the nature o_ the "crowding
out" effect, if any, that exists, an attempt will be made
to empirically, determine its. impact on nominal, and real
interest rates.
Review of Related Literature
Early Keynesian analysis posits that the non-
dietortionary changes._in fiscal policy have direct_ demand
.effects. on consumption via t_he changes in current disposable
income.induced by them. This effect _s modified ..somewhat
by the subsequent monetary effects arising from higher
incomes which raise interest rates. An important caveat is
that the manner in which the public reacts to the changes
in policy has implications.on the potency, of..pol_cy.
It is the latter caveat which has given rise to the
revival of the Ricardian equivalence proposition [See
6Kochin (1974), and Tanner (1979)]o The Ricardian equivalence
proposition asserts that the public responds in the same
manner to a change in taxes and a change in the government
deficit. A tax cut would increase the government deficit
and households perceive the future tax liabilities implicit
in the deficit. Thus, they would save an amount equal to
the present value of interest payments needed to service
the debt. Contrary to Keynesian predictions, therefore,
there would be no effect on aggregate demand, Barro (1974)
posits that the utility of today's generation depends
indirectly on the utility of future generations as these
generations overlap, Today's ,taxpayers will, therefore, not
consume at the expense of their heirs. Instead, today's
taxpayers will increase their savings so that their
bequests to future generations, including government debt,
would be the same as if the government deficit had not
occurred.
Many of the early empirical studies use a life-cycle
model to test whether government debt is perceived toadd
to net wealth or not. Feldstein (1982) finds support for
the proposition that government debt constitutes part of net
wealth as there is no evidence that consumers discount
future taxes at all. Tanner (1979), Kormendi (1983),
Aschauer (1985), and Seater and Mariano (1985) find evidence
to the contrary.
Feldstein (1982) is skeptical about the Ricardian
equivalence proposition and what he calls the ,e×-ante
"crowding out" effect. He argues that changes in government
expenditure would have no effect on aggregal;e demand only
if an equal concurrent change in private saving were
induced. Even if a change in private saving were to occur,
there is no reason to believe that it would necessari.ly
occur concurrently. It is also possible that an increase i,n
government spending in one year may signal higher spending
in future years and hence, higher taxes_to, finance such
spending. A rise in current taxes may also signal a:,rise in
future taxes. In either case, the effect on consumption
depends not so much on the present fiscal policy but on the
_signals regarding future policy which current policy
'\,..
conveys. In Feldstein's view, the Ricardian equivalence
Proposition focuses entirely on future tax liabilities
needed to service debt, He points out that current fiscal
policy has implications for the future course of fiscal
policy independent of debt service obligations. The potency
of fiscal policy need not be negated as- it would be in the
case of the Ricardian equivalence proposition; Like
Feldstein, Remolona (1985) is also skeptical about :the
significance of the Ricardian equ_,valence proposition,
especially in LDCs, LDCs generally have fragmented, or non-
existent capital markets. The government can also offer
debt more efficiently and hence, create net wealth. Also,
the neutrality result would not hold since taxes tend to
8be distortionary and there would be substitution effects
from taxes needed to service the debt.
Feldstein (1982) uses a single equation model of
U.S. real per capita consumer.expenditure from 19.30-1977,
excluding 1941-1946, as a function of permanent
income, the value of private wealth, the value of future
social security benefits, government spending, tax
revenues, government transfers, and net debt of the
government. Despite some endogeneity problems arising from
the effect of taxes on consumption and vice'versa, as well
aspotential collinearity among the regressors, Feldstein
concludes that changes in government .spending or taxes
can have substantial effects on aggregate demand.
Yawitz and Meyer (1976) use a single equation
model of real consumer expenditures as a function of real
disposable income, the real net worth of households
excluding holdings of government debt by the private
sector, and the real market value of private sector
holdings of government debt. The equation is estimated
using U.S. data for the period 1953-69. They posit that if
the coefficient on the real market value of private sector
holdings of government debt is zero, then future taxes are
being discounted completely. They find instead that the
coefficient on this variable is positive, statistically
significant, and ]arger than that on net private wealth.
They conclude that there is no evidence that consumers
9discount future taxes .even partially. Government debt
constitutes part of net wealth.
In his comment on their paper, Tanner (1979)
criticizes the specification of their equation, for
omitting numerous sources of life-cycle income. Including
variables such as accrued income, disposable income adjusted
by the current unemployment rate to account for cyclical
variations in disposable income, is more in keeping
Q
with the spirit of the Ando-Modigliani life-cycle approach.
Using U.S. data for 1947-74, he finds that the coefficient
on government debt is not statistically different from zero.
He concludes that government debt is not net wealth.
Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), and Seater and Mariano
(1985) also find no evidence that consumption is related
to the budget deficit.
Other types of tests have been devised tO test whether
the public perceives the future tax implications of
alternative methods of financing the deficit, Tanner
(1970) investigates the existence of a real balance effect
in Canada and finds that consumers discount 98 percent of
future tax liabilities. Kochin (1974) uses Friedman's
specification of the permanent income hypothesis and finds
a significant amount of discounting using US data over the
1952-71 period. Feldstein (1974) and Munnell (1974) find
that social security payments reduce savings in the U,S,
10
Barro's (1978) study shows, however, that social security
payments do not affect aggregate consumption behavior.
Recent studies on the public's perception of whether
financing government expenditures leads to changes in the
public's net wealth have been applied to financial market_
assumed to be. characterized by market efficiency. These
include studies by Plosser (1982), Huang (1986), and Evans
(1987).
Plossser (1982) finds that innovations in government
purchases are negatively retated to excess nominal returns
on U.S. treasury bills, implying that these innovations are
associated with highernominal interest rates. However, he
cannot determine whether this is due to an increase in.
expected inflation or an increase in the real rate of
interest. While this is the case, he also finds that using
debt for taxes or base money for taxes has no bearing on
interest rate movements. What this means is that the
public perceives that the government merely trades current
taxes for future taxes when there is a shift from tax
finance to deficit finance. Furthermore, the monetization
of government debt does not mitigate the "crowding out"
effect.
Huang (1986) modifies Plosser's study of using real
.returns instead of excess nominal returns in order to test
the neutrality proposition, since the latter does not rule
11
ouran effect on nominal returns but does rule out an
impact on real returns. He also uses data on corporate
equities and debts in addition to those on the government
bond and bill markets. .He finds that contemporaneous
innovations in monetized debt or privately-held debt do not
affect real returns. In multi-market tests, he arrives at
the same conclusion except in the case of common
stocks. His results are consistent with the Ricardian
equivalence proposition that the public correctly perceives
that the increase in the budget deficit entails future tax
liabilities and they respond by saving more. Evans (1987)
also finds no evidence to support the thesis that past,
present, or future budget deficits lead to higher e×-post
real rates.
2Financing of the Deficit4
The proportion of the deficit financed by money
creation, domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing using
monthly data are shown in Table I-A. These ratios are
calculated in the following way:
holdings of Aholdings of
government debt - required
Proportion .of the by the reserves
Budget Deficit Central Bank :,
Financed by =
Money Creation Budget Deficit
This measure takes into account the reserve requirement
ratio prescribed by the Central Bank and recognizes that
required reserves are a leakage from the money creation
process.
A holdings of A holdings of
government debt reserve-
by the private - eligible
Proportion of the sector, trust securities
Budget Oef.icit funds, and semi-
financed by gov't entities
domestic market. =
borrowing Budget Deficit
The entities included in the private sector are commercial
banks, thrift b_nks, investment houses, insurance companies,
private corporations, and other private indirect bearers.
Those included undertrust funds are the Bond Sinking
Fund, Economic Support Fund, and Industrial Guarantee Loan
Fund. Finally, semi-government entities include the Social
4 The measurement of the budget deficit is shown in
Exhibit . I .
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Security System, the Development Bank of th e Philippines,
and the Government Service Insurance System. Banks in the
Philippines are allowed to hold reserve-eligible securities
in order to meet reserve requirements. The change in
holdings of reserve eligible securities is subtracted
because this is effectively part of the money supply.
Aholdings of government debt by
Proportion of the the foreign sector
Budget Deficit =
financed by Budget Deficit
foreign borrowing
It is apparent from Table I-A that most of the money
creation ratios are negative. This means that monetary
policy has been quite contractionary since required reserves
are larger than monetized debt, as a proportion of the
deficit. The yearly ....averages also show how contractionary
policy has been since 1983, probably in response to the
IMF stabilization strategy.
The yearly average for, the 11 months of 1986 is unusual
because the figures for June 1986 seem to be outliers,
Domestic borrowing tends to move inverselywith foreign
borrowing. Domestic borrowing exhibited dramatic reversals
in short periods of time such as those for April 1985
(123.13) and July 1985 (-220.514).
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Empirical Methodology and Results
Table I-B shows that the par value of privately-held
government debt (debt held by commercial banks, thrift
banks, and other private holders) over the last six years
has continuously increased. The semestral average of this
variable has continuously increased, with the exception of
the period 1983.07 to 1983.12 in which it did not decline
very much. It can therefore be surmised that the principal
is essentially rolled over. We can then consider the rule
for financing interest payments.
Following Cox (1984), several non-parametric procedures
are utilized to obtain characteristics of the distribution
of 8, the ratio of the deficit to interest outlays. Cox
assumes that there is only one type of Treasury bond and
it promises to pay the holder $I per period forever. The
Treasury finances each $1 of interest by z ¢ via taxes
and the remainder, ¢ = ($1-t¢), via bonds, Tests are
performed to determine if 8 is a normally and independently
distributed random variable. If 8 is not independently
distributed, then there is a potentially discernible
financing rule which could negate the proposition that bonds
are part of net wealth.
As shown in Appendix A.I, using Quarterly data for
1979-1986, the stem and leaf plot of 8 exhibits tails
approximating those of a normal distribution,
15
The average value of 6 is 1.74 and the standard
deviation is 2.16. Since the average value of 8 is
greater than unity, the implication is that there was, on
the average, no tax liability over the 1979-1986 period.
From the historical distribution of 8, the first and third
quartile boundaries are calculated as Q1 = 0.1235 and
Q_ = 3,38051, respectively. The difference between Q3
and Q_, the inter-quartile range, is 3.6816. In a normal
distribution, the inter-quartile range is 1.35 times the
standard deviation. It is possible, therefore, to calculate
a pseudo-standard deviation by dividing the inter-quartile
range by 1.35. The pseudo-standard deviation is 2.727.
This pseudo-standard deviation closely approximates the
historical standard deviation as the difference between them
is 0.56,
Another non-parametric procedure involves calculating
the upper and lower bounds for values of B and seeing
whether there are any outliers, assumi_t a normal
distribution. The •upper and lower bounds are calculated
by multiplying the inter-quartile range by 1.5 and adding
it to Q_ to obtain the upper bound, and subtracting it
from Q_ to obtain the lower bound. The upper and lower
bounds obtained are 8.83 and -4.75, respectively.
Examination of the values of Quarterly 8 indicates that
there are no outliers.
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Appendix A.II shows the results using monthly data from
1981.01 to 1986.12. A stem and leaf plot of 8 exhibits
tails approximating those of a normal distribution.
The average value of 8 is 2.33 and the standard
deviation is 3.19. Again, since the average value of 8 is
greater than unity, the implication is that there was, on
average, no tax liability. The first and third quartile
boundaries are calculated as 0.23 and 4.28, respectively.
The inter-quartile range is 4.05. The pseudo-standard
deviation of 3.00 is very close to the historical standard
deviation of 3.19. The difference between them is 0.19.
The upper and lower bounds of 8 are 10.56 and -5.84,
respectively. There are only three out of seventy-two
values of 8 which are outliers and these are the values
for 1981.02, 1981.05, and 1982.05.
To test whether 8 is non-stationary or time dependent,
8 is regressed against time. Using quarterly data, the
coefficient on the time variable is not statistically
significant, suggesting that 8 is stationary. However,
when monthly data are used; the coefficient on the time
variable is significantly negative. This suggests that 8
may not be a stationary random variable.
17
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Quarterly Data:1979.1-1986.4 Monthly Data:1981.01-1986.12
8 = 1.8843 - 0.0039 TIME !8 = 4.6485 - 0.0634 TIME
•(2.4458) (-0.0966) (6.5980) (_3_7812) ''_
R2 = 0.00311 DW = 0.7265 Rz = 0.1696 _BW =_2;1385
F = 0.009 F = 14.30
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Figures II.A and II.B show graphs of the ratio of the
budget deficit to interest payments, 6 , using Quarterly and
monthly data. Since there is a slight downward trend in
6, the first difference of the 8 series, DRAT, was
obtained. Figures III.A and III.B shows graphs of the
first difference of 8 using Quarterly and monthly data.
The trend is not evident anymore.
It must be determined ,
independently distributed over time. If 6 is not inde-
pendently distributed over time, then past observations may
be used in forecasting expected tax liabilities of
government debt. If the public can perceive the future tax
• '. ,
liabilities implicit in the deficit then an ex-ante
"Crowding out" effect a la Ricardian Equivalence may occur
as the public saves an amount equal to the present value of
the interest payments needed to service the debt.
The partial autocorrelations for DRAT using Quarterly
data are shown in Appendix A.III. Based on this, an AR(2)
model is estimated. Both coefficients on the AR(1) and
AR(2) variables are significant. The partial auto-
18
correlations for DRAT using monthly data • are shown in
Appendix A.IV. Again, an AR(2) model is estimated. Both
coefficients on AR(1) and AR(2) are significant. Using
quarterly data, the Q-statistics, [Q(k)], for 8 at lags of
6, 12, 18, and 24 are 29.18, 50.43, 53.61, and 55.25,
respectively, indicating significant accumulated auto-
correlations at short, medium, or long lags. Based on the
chi-square statistics, (Xz)' with k degrees of freedom
(where k is the number of lags used), we find _z statistic
values of 18.54, 28.38, 37.15, and 45.55 with 6, 12, 18,
and 24 degrees of freedom, respectively, given a
significance level of 0.005. Therefore, there is less
than half a percent probability that quarterly 8 is randomly
distributed. However, the Q-statistics for quarterly DRAT
at lags of 6, 12, 18, and 24 are 7.11, 9.53, 14.62,
and 16.08, respectively, indicating that quarterly DRAT
is randomly distributed. Using monthly data, the Q-
statistics for 8 obtained at lags of 6, 12, 18, and 24
are 33.64, 55.13, 51.17 and 66.47, respectively. This
indicates that monthly 6 exhibits a pattern. The same
: ',._.
result .is obtained for monthly DRAT where the Q-statistics
are 32.65, 52.76, 64.28, and 77.59 for the same lags.
In general, the 6 series is not independently
distributed over time and exhibits a pattern. DRAT, with
the exception of quarterly data, also exhibits a pattern
over time.
19
To test whether a shift occurred in the distribution/
of 6, the data are divided into two groups and each groupl
is regressed against a time variable. Using quarterly
data, •from 1979.1 to 1983.2, one obtains a significant
coefficient on time while that using data from 1983.3 to
1986.4 is not significant. This suggests that a shift
occurred in the distribution of 8. To test whether the
shift is significant, the Chow test is performed. The
calculated F-statistic is 5.863, and it e xceed_,'t_e
critical F value which is 3.34 at 0.05 level of
significance with 2 and 28 degrees of freedom.
" _'I' - ,, ,
!979,1 to 1983,2 .).._83.3 to 1986.4
8 = -0,07 + 0,25 TIME 8 = 0.4 .+-0,03 TIME
(-0.06) (2.45) (0.21) (0.42)
) i_
R2 = 0.27 DW = 0.9 F = 5.998 R2 = 0.01 DW = 1.7 F = 0.117
" - .... i.ii.._.',
Using monthly data from 1981.01 to 1983.12 and 1984.01
to 1986.12, the coefficient on the time variable is
negatively significant in the former case and barely
significant in the latter case. • Again, there is evidence
indicating that a shift occurred in the distribution of B.
The calculated F value of 4.234 exceeds the critical F
value of 3.07 at 0.05 level of significance with 2 and 68
degrees of freedom.
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1981.01 to 1983.12 1984.01 to 1986.12
8 = 5,98 - 0,127 TIME 6 = -1.69 - 0,050 TIME
(4.98) , (-2.25) (-1,00) (1,649)
R2 = 0.13 DW = 2.4 F = 5...105 Rz = 0.07 DW = 1,67 F= 2.72
,' In general, there does seem to be some evidence to
indicate that the behavior of 8 shifted over time.
9Ummary and. Conc 1usi ons
This section attempts to determine if there is a
discernible rule for financing public debt. Several non-
parametric tests are utilized to determine whether 8, the
ratio of the deficit to interest outlays, is a normal,
independently-distributed random variable. 8 is assumed to
be _he proportion of interest payments by bond issue. The
focus is on the rule for financing interest payments since
the evidence indicates that the principal is simply rolled
over.
The evidence indicatesthat 8 is a randomly-distributed
random variable. However, its time series properties
indicate that it is not independently distributed over
time. This means that a discernible rule exists whereby
the public is able to determine their expected tax
liabilities. If this is so, then according to Ricardian
Equivalence Theory, the public will save an amount equal
to the present value of their expected tax liabilities and
21
debt issuance w_lnot be .viewed as adding, to_net wealth.
Debt issuance will. not haveany effect on. real consumption
and therefore.any.discussion of a "crowding out" effect is
irrelevant. :. :
There is evidence, however, to suggest that in the
case of the Philippines, the story advanced by Ricardian
Equivalence Theory may not be valid despite the presence of
a discernible financing rule. First, the average value of
8 is above unity, suggesting that both the government and
the public behave as though there are no future tax
liabilities associated with financing interest payments.
Since the public can discern this via the pattern exhibited
by & over time, there is no reason for them to discount
future tax liabilitie8. The only randomness i8 the degree
of "subsidy" via bond issuance since Chow tests reveal that
l
8 exhibited a shift over time.
The implication is that financing rules, though
.discernible, do matter in the case of the Philippines. If
bond issuance adds to net wealth because the government
acts as though there are no future tax liabilities implicit
in such issuance, then discussions of the degree of
"crowding out" are not irrelevant. This means that in the
case of some developing countries, such as the Philippines,
the pursuit of various liberalization schemes may be
hampered not only by the size of the deficit, but also by
the adverse effects of financing of these deficits via bond
_2
issuance. It also means that these adverse effects will
persist until the authorities are able to make credible
changes in the manner they operate. Determining the degree
of the traditional "crowding out" is the subject of the
next section.
23
II
The assumption of rational expectations or market
efficiency is used to investigate the impact of financing
decisions on interest rates. The interest rates used in
the study are various T-bill rates. There is a well-
organized secondary market for Treasury bills which
Q
justifies using tests of market efficiency in this
particular market. The specification and methodology
closely follow those in related studies by Plosser (1982),
Mishkin (1983), Huang (1986), and Evans (1987).
Traditional theory suggests that ceteris paribus,
(I) balanced budget increases in government spending raise
nominal interest rates;
(2) increases in debt issued by the Treasury held by
private sector raise nominal interest rate via a "crowding
out" effect; and
(3) increases in monetized debt lower nominal interest
rates initiallyvia a liquidity effect, or until expect-
ations of inflation reverse this downward movement in
interest rates via the Fisher effect.
A simple equation characteristic of tests of
traditional theory is the following:
it = aiGt + a2PDt + a_Mt + a4Zt (I)
where it is the nominal interest rate at the end of one
period on one-period bonds; G, PD, and • M are measures
24
of government spending, privately-held debt, and monetized
debt, .respectively; Z is a vector of other variables
including lags of G, PD, and M; the a_ are coefficients
to be estimated,
Applying the expectations operator E( • /It-t) to both
sides of (I), where It-1 is the information available at
t-.l, given the assumption of marRet efficiency, and
subtracting the resulting equation from (i). yields
UIt = biUGt + b2UPDt + b_UMt + Vt (2)
where UI.t; _ it - E(it / I,;-i)
UGt _ Gt . - E(Gt / It-l)
UPD._ _ PDt - E(PDt / It_1)
Vt_ a4Z_ - E(a4Zt / It-l)
Vt is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors and
with Gt, PDt, and Mt contemporaneously. If V_ is not
uncorrelated with past or future values of Gt, PDt, and Mr,
then (2) will not be a true reduced form and the bs will
not beconsistent.
In order to estimate (2), it is necessary to obtain
measures of the unanticipated components of nominal interest
rates, government spending, privately held debt, and
monetized debt. Because the forward market in the
Philippines does not exist except for forward cover, first
differences of the nominal interest rate are used to proxy
for the unanticipated component of nominal interest rate
movements. In other words, E(it / It-z) = it-l, meaning
25
that the .interest rate series follows a random walk. This
:.(
assumption is not rejected empirically. S
For the financing Variables, linear forecasting
equations including lags of the particular variables in
question, the other financing variables, and other
relevant variables are used. The F-test isutilized to
determine which variables and their lags are jointly
significant at the 5% level and hence, are to be retained.
X_; : Zt-i _ + Ut (3)
where X_ is the particular financing variable in question
Zt_1 is a Vector of variables used to forecast Xt
available at time t-1
a is a vector of coefficients
Ut is a serially-uncorrelatederror term
Since there are three financing variables, there will
be three forecasting equations following the specification
in (3),
5 When i' is regressed on 1 lag of itself, the co-
efficient on the lag is not significantly different from 1.
TB91 = 0.982 + 0.944 TB91(-1)
(1.181) (22.901)
See also graphg.
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GEt : Zt-1 a G + Ut G (3a)
POt : Zt-1 u P° + Ut P° (3b)
Mt z Zt-i aM + Ut M (3c)
The superscripts indicate the particular financing variable
concerned. (3a), (3b), and (3c) are then estimated jointly
with the following version of (2)-
n
it - it-1 : be + Z gi G [GE- Z_.-1 am]
L = (>
t'l
+ Z _.iP0 [PD -- Zt,.-] a PD ]
i =o
n
+ Z f3_M [M - Zt..L a'_] + e_; (4)
i =0
where the as in (4) are constrained to be equal to the
corresponding as in (3a), (3b), and (3c). 6 _-_ i_ _l_s_med
b Tests of the va] idity of these constraints are to be
conducted by estimating (3a), (_Xb), (3c),, and (4) with and
without the constraints_ Yhe test statistic is constructed
in the following manner:
2n log [SSR c - SSR u ]
where n is the number of observations
SSR c is the sum of squared residuals of the
constrained eystem
SSR u is the sum of squared residuals of the
unconstrained system
The 'test-statistic is distributed as a x2(q) .where q is
the number of constraints.
The validity of the constraints not only indicates
whether market participants form their expectations
consistently with the known economic structure but also
indicates the appropriateness of the model specified. R
rejection of the constraints, therefore, could be due to
the failure of one or both of these-
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to be uncorrelated with .the regressors in (4) in order to
identify the Bts and obtain consistent estimates of them.
_t is modelled as a first-order autoregressive process i.e.,
Et : Et-1 + Nt.
Following Plosser ,(1982), the three policy variables
are the log of the monetized debt, the log of privately-held
debt, and the log of government expenditures. The optimal
linear forecast of a policy variable, Xt is defined as:
E(x, / It-l)
where It-i is the available information set on which the
forecast is conditioned on. The innovation in Xt is
defined as the difference between actual Xt and the optimal
linear forecast of Xt.
Experimentation with uniform lags of 5 and 10 lags of
different sets of explanatory variables in the forecasting
equations indicates at least two potentially appropriate
forecasting equations. The error term in each of the three
policy forecasting .eQuations is assumed to be serially
uncorrelated. .,
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In the first set of forecasting equations, uniform lags
of 5 of each of the following regressors are used: log of
government expenditures, log of monetized debt, log of
privately-held debt, interest rate, log of the exchange
rate, and the growth rate of the industrial •production
index. If the monetary authorities intervene in the foreign
exchange market, as •they allegedly do in the Philippines,
the exchange rate. could be useful in predicting the money
supply. Industrial production index, as a proxy for GNP
which is not on a monthly basis, could be useful in
predicting future taxes and money demand.
In the second set of forecasting equations, each
variable is regressed against uniform lags of 10 of the
three policy variables.
The results of the F-test are available upon request
from the author.
Thedata are monthly, covering the period January 1981
to December 1986. A description of the data is contained in
Appendix C.
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Empirical Results
Traditional theory predicts that the coefficients
government spending and privately-held debt. should De
significant3y positive. The coefficient on. money should• be
significant]y negative.
On ._he other hand, Ricard.ian Equivalence Theory posits
that government bonds do not add to the net wealth of the
private sector and-nominal interest rates are independent of
the manner in which government spending is financed. This
implies that the coeficients on unanticipated privately-held
.debt .and unanticipated money should not be significantly
different tom zero. This theory, while precluding •any
effect of the manner of financing government spending on
nominal interest rates, does not precludethe possibility
that innovations in government spending affect nominal
interes_ rates.
Table II presents the results of the joint estimation
of (3a), (3b), (3c), and (4) in which the forecasting
equations for the,policy variables use 5 lags each of logs
of the policy variables, the. interest rate, the exchange
rate, and th_ growth rate of the production index.
3O
The last column in Table II shows the effect of a
positive innovation ingovernment spending financed by
taxes, as the innovation in government spending is
orthogonal to innovations in monetized debt and privately-
held debt. The innovation in government spending is
significantly positively related to nominal interest rate
movements. This means that balanced budget increases in
government spending are associated with increases in
interest rates.
There are two ways in which the increase in nominal
interest rates.could occur: one is via an increase in the
rate of inflation and the other is via an increase in the
real interest rate. The correlation between the innovations
in government spending and monetized debt is negative
(-0.40) and seems to indicate that an increase in expected
inflation is an unlikely channel. The alternative channel,
in which the output effects of government spending purchase
arise from changes in real rates of interest, might be
worth exploring.
The second to the last column in Table II shows the
effect of a surprise substitution of debt for taxes on
nominal interest rates. The coefficient on the innovation
in privately-held debt is significantly positive. This
finding is consistent with the "crowding out" effect. It
is inconsistent with Ricardian equivalence. Again, the
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positive effect of privately-held debt could occur via an
inflation channel of a real interest rate channel.
The coefficient on the log of monetized debt shows the
effect of a fall in taxes financed by debt issue matched by
an open market purchase. The coefficient is negative, as
predicted by traditional theory, but it is not statis-
tically significant.
The likelihood ratio tests indicate that the validity
of the cross equation constraints cannot be rejected. 7
Although P ,the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is
significant, an ARIMA check of the residuals indicates
that there is no significant serial correlation left.
Since the logs of the policy variables may be non-
stationary, the estimation in Table II was repeated using
growth rates, i.e., first differences of logs. The results
are similar to those obtained in Table I and are not
reported separately.
Further Tests
Following Huang (1986), the dependent variable is
specified in real terms to test for the neutrality
proposition subscribed to by the rational expectations
school. The dependent variable is specified as the ex-
7 The results of the likelihood ratio tests are found
in Rppsndix B.
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post real. rate of interest, i.e.,
( it - inflation rate_ ) - ( it-1 - inflation ratet-t )
the inflation rate is measured using the monthly CPI index
calculated on a year-to-year basis. If the neutrality
proposition holds, none of the innovations in the policy
variables should have a statistically-significant effect on
movements in ex-post real rates.
The results using the 91-day e×-post real rate as the
dependent variable are shown in Table III, Only innovations
in privately-held government debt are significantly•
positive. This indicates that some financing decisions
have non-neutral effects. It also strengthens the earlier
finding of a significant "crowding out" effect. None of
the other policy variables are statistically significant.
The sign of the coefficient on monetized debt is
inconsistent with that hypothesized by traditional theory',
The equations in Table II were re-estimated using the
360-day Treasury Bill rate instead of the 91-day rate to
ascertain whether the "crowding out" result is discernible
for bills with longer maturity. The•results are shown in
Table IV. None of the coefficients of the policy Variables
are statistically significant, These results imply that
the "crowding out" effect is a short-lived • phenomenon.
An ARIMA check of the residuals indicates the absence of
significant serial correlation. However, the appropriate-
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hess:of the model is questionable as the likelihood ratio
test statistic is negative.
The results using the 360-day ex-post .real rate.'@s the
dependent variable, are shown in Table V. Again.,,_none ",_f
the coefficients are statistically significant "and no
significant "crowding out" effect exists. This result,
however, may be due to certain structura_ feature,s in
developing countries, such as a high rate of time
preference,, which could ob_c,Jre the finding of a
significant "crowding out" effect for longer-termbonds.
When the alternative forecasting equationwith 10 lags
of each of the policy variables is used, as shown i.n Table
Vl, the results are very different from those in Tables II
and llI. There is no statistically significant "crowding
out" effect. The coefficient on innovations in _ government
expenditures is likewise insignificant and of the wrong sign
based on traditional theory and Ricardian Equivalence
theory, These results, s.hown in Table VI, could be due to a
misspecification of the forecasting equations, if the
forecasting equations are misspecified, this wil} tend to
bias the coefficients of the r.h.s, policy variables
toward zero. The forecasting equations used here do. not
include the exchange rate as an explanatory variable. If
it is true that the monetary authorities tend to fix the
exchange rate, then omitting this variable may result in
misspecification. The positive coefficient on monetized
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debt is spurious since it implies that innovations in money
are quickly translated to expectations of inflation, yet
the correlation between innovations in government spending
..and monetized debt is quite small (0.005). The likelihood
ratio test statistic is negative, indicating that the model
•used may be inappropriate.
Summary and Conclusions
This study is anattempt to determine the validity of
the traditional "crowding out" effect versus the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem in the case of a developing country,
the Philippines. The traditional "crowding out" effect is
premised on the notion that the public views the issuance
of bonds to finance the deficit as part of net wealth. As
net wealth, consumption therefore rises, and so do interest
rates., Under a regime where interest rates are free of
ceilings, the "crowding out" effect may be measured by
the degree to which interest rates rise as a direct result
of the financing•decisions of the authorities. The Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem, on the other hand, implies that the
public realizes that bond issuance implies future taxation
and hence, bonds do not add to net wealth. Financing
decisions do not matter.
The assumption of rationality of expectations, or
market efficiency, in the treasury bill market is used in
the empirical tests. The forecasting equations and interest
3B
rate equation are estimated jointly with cross-equation
constraints.
The results indicate that there is a significant
"crowding out" effect when the first difference of the 91-
day Treasury Bill rate is the dependent variable, regardlese
of whether the interest rate is specified in nominal or
real terms. Innovations in government spending also raise
nominal interest rates and there are indications that this
is due to changes in inter-temporal rates of substitution
rather than an increase in the expected rate of inflation.
There is no support for the proposition that debt
monetization mitigates the "crowding out" effect. The
validity of the cross equation 'rationality' constraints
cannot be rejected. The residuals are white noise.
While a significant "crowding out" effect exists, it is
apparently a short-lived phenomenon. Using the first
difference of the 360-day Treasury 8ill rate as the
dependent variable, no statistically significant "crowding
out" effect is found. However, the absence of a discernible
"crowding out" effect on a long-term security may be
because of certain structural features present in developing
economies, One such feature is the high rate of time
preference. There tends to be very little lending or
borrowing on a long-term basis. The earlier results
confirming the presence of "crowding out" are not invariant
with respect to the specification of the policy forecasting
3B
equations, although this may be because the alternative
forecasting equations are inappropriate
In general, the results indicate that unlike the.
findings of numerous studies for developed countries, the
"crowding out" effect is not irrelevant forsome developing
countries although it is apparently a short-lived
phenomenon. Furthermore, the "crowding out" effect does
not Seem to arise because of irrationality on the part of
the public as the cross-equation constraints cannot be
rejected in most cases. The government can in. fact create
net wealth not only because of certain structural features
present.in, developing countries such as fragmented capital
.markets, etc., but also because the government may act in
a manner in which it disregards its budget .constraint,
continuously financing spending by issuing bonds which it
keeps rolling over. The public sees the absence of expected
tax liabilities normally associated with debt issue as well
as the postponement or .absence of the day of reckoning.
Nevertheless, further research efforts should be directed
at discovering how government issuance of.bonds addsto net
wealth in the case of the. Philippines and other developing
countries.
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EXHIBIT I
Measurement of the Budget Deficit
In this study, the Treasury and IMF definition of the budget
deficit is used. The data are quoted on a cash disbursement
basis. The components of revenues and expenditures are shown .on
the following page.
CONSOLIDATED CASH OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
(Treasury and IMF Definition)
1. Budgetary Revenues
Tax Revenues
BIR Collections
Customs C;o-I l ecl:.i ons
C.ollecbions of Other Offices
Non-Tax Revenues
• Ecor_omic '3upport Fund
Oper.'._ting and Miscellaneous Income
(Fees and ,':;1:her- Charges)
Interest on Deposits
T_r_terest.on Advances t.o GovernmeF,.r.. C.orporations
Forelgn Grar_t,$ and Con1.,-"lbutions
,'"] nc 1udes base rent..:_.l s)
Other Non-Tax Revenues
'.; Expenditures
Current Operating Expenses
Personnel Services .- includes wages and transfer
oaym,(ents
Naint.enance and Other Operating Expenses
Allot.merit to L..oca; Government Units
Debt Service: IntereSt Payments
Subs i di es
Transferred Liabil ities from PNB a.nd DBP
Capital Out.1 ays
I nf rast r..uct u re
Equity Investment Outlay/Capitalization
(includes GFIs and government corporations)
Loans Outlay/Net Lending (includes GFIs and
government corporations)
Other Capital Ou5lays
Note that the debt service under expenditures includes only
interest payments and not amort, i]z a t i O r] S , and that. equ i ty
investments and lending to both government corporations _nd
government financial institutions are included under capital
outlays.
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TABLE I-A
FINANCING THE BUDGET DEFICIT
N-CREATE AVE-NC OPEN-NKT. AVE-ONB FOREIGN AVE-FB
1981.01 0
1981 02 --0 08295 0 09907 0
198! 03 -0 32356 0 53125 0
1981 04 -1 88773 -o'_ 66158 0
1981 05 -0 20910 -0 00864 0
1981 06 -0 72220 -0.64510 0 22828 -0.56232 0 0
1981 07 -0 13108 cq 45587 0
1981 08 -0 23962 0 33897 , 0
1981 09 0 23250 0 37455 0
198! 10 -0 16566 0 55158 0
1981 11, -0 10573 -0 04232 " 0
1981 12 -0 40398 -0.13559 -0 00021 0.244512 0 0
1982 01 1 644d5 4 59697 0
1982 02 -0 10900 -5.36091 0
1982 03 0.92389 4,50021 0
!982.04 -1,47843 88/45311 0
1982 05 -0.07429 0 07898 0
!982 06 -0.49945 0.067928 0 02688 17.53965 0 0
1982 07 0.40406 -0 13156 0
1982 08 -~0.133!5 0 28290 0
1982 09 -.0 48995. 0 71846 0
i982 !0 2 40370 1 4622[7 0
1982 11 -3 36958 3 14240 c)
19.82 12 1 03502 -0.02498 -0 76629 0.967,a47 0 0
198"'o 01 -_5_ 74920 17 5535,2 2 57746
198:3 02 -3 24743 3 07516 0 12179
1983 03 -1 78276 2 85875 - 0 09661
1983 04 4 83871 -6 33870 0 61290
1983 05 -0.71424 1 21316 0 12347
1983 06 -0.95130 -4.60103 -0 14012 0.133649 0 05819 0.202593
1983 07 35.80952 43 58095 6 76190
1983 08 0.67391 -1 86272 -0 18962
lq °" Oq -26 64730..oo _ , 9 555.91 3 27956
1983 10 6.65882 -29 32350 7 35294
1983 11 -5,69768 0 37217 0 73043
1983 12 -0.311 "_'_ . -0 _ . -0 08951 0 904937_,L,, i 747661 11319 -4 27'¢26 . .
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M-CREATE AVE-MC OPEN-MKT. AVE-OMB FOREIGN AVE-FB
1984.01 1.20405 0 11185 0.48636
1984.02 -0.74671 0 05808 -0.00061
1984.03 -0.75881 -0 31096 -0.00307
1984.04 0.34286 -4 99789 0.15966
1984.05 -6.67421 4 53342 -0.11842
1984.06 8.45977 0.304490 "2 91532 -0.72653 ....... 1.37931 •0.283374
1984.07 -1.78935 -0 43540 -0.02902
1984.08 0.44920 5 03424 -0.00796
1984 09 0.11270 2 05147 -0.07506
1984 10 -040170 1.96292 0.14663
1984 11 1 14268 18 74066 0.08804
1984 12 -0 36710 -0,14226 1 26090 5.810035 -0.01509 0.027312
1985 01 0 92676 22 35399 0.08232
1985 02 -0 86463 0 60703 0.00276
1985 03 -2 23222 -7 94666 -0.23611
1985 04 -4 10588 123 13820 0.92647
1985 05 -0 66379 6 98595 0.15823
1985 06 -0 37217 -1.21865 4 48736 25.45437 -0.00353 0.169562
1985 07 -41 58570 -220.51400 14.42857
1985 08 -0 19256 0.80726 0.14412
1985 09 0 31540 -1.34278 0.02799
1985 10 -0 36512 0.25286 -0.08869
1985 11 0.19787 -1.23037 • -0.09857
1985 12 -0 21559 -6.97428 -0.01110 -0.30482 0.00048 -0.00293
1986 01 0 24•621 0.46415 _,0.03390 •
1986 02 0 15870 3 19519 0.09356
1_86 03 -0 21842 3 32022 -0.05778
1986 04 0 13574 -3 97357 0.04047
1986 05 -0 10958 1 92828 • -0.15621
1986.06 -270.38500 -45.0287 -298 25700 -58.7573 5.28571 1.041149
1986 07 1.80794 0 58430 -0,03174
1986 08 -0,11473 -0 38831 0,00482
1986 09 -0,88954 3 70694 -0,00285
1986 10 0.16621 -0 38339 0,00525
1986 11 -0.31543 0 18334 0,00000
1986 12 -0,12754 0,087818 0,00347 0,624408 0,00088 0,00162
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Figure I-A. 1
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Figure I-A.2
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TABLE I-B
PRIVATE HOLDINGS
OF OUTSTANDING GOV'T SECURITIES
(In Million Pesos)
PERIOD PRIVATE AVE-PRIV PERIOD PRIVATE AVE-PRIV
1981.01 16981 1984 01 23089
1981J02 17106" 1984 02 23837
1981 03 17627 1984 03 26484
198"1 04 17672 1984 04 27731
1981 05 17248 1984 05 25385
1981 06 171"09 17290.50 1984 06 25230 25292.67
1981 07 17654 1984 07 24572
198"1 08 18241 1984.08 27668
1981 09 18271 1984,09 31715
1981 10 18350 1984.10 33841
1981 11 18246 1984.11 35559
1981 12 18284 18174.33 1984.12 39910 32210.83
1982 01 18244 1985.01 39143
1982 02 21944 1985.02 41485
1982 03 21023 1985.03 43292
1982 04 19746 1985,04 50358
1982 05 18701 1985.05 57262
1982 06 19042 19783,33 1985.06 6"2440 48996.67
1982 07 19273 1985.07 63671
1982 08 19758 1985..08 64304
1982,09 2"1273 19_5.09 65433
1982 10 20778 1985,10 64867
1982 11 22240 1985,11 63224
1982 12 21348 20778;'33 1985,12 62701 64033.33
1983 01 24136 1986,01 64481
1983 02 25112 1986.02 71072
1983 03 25704 1986,03 81664
1983 04 24808 1986,04 87021
1983 05 25792 1986.05 88677
1983.06 26018 25261.67 1986 06 88954 80311.50
1983.07 25287 1986 07 89566
19"83.08 25250 1986 08 92938
1983.09 26403 1986 09 90336
1983.10 25530 1986 10 90803
1983.11 23995 1986 11 94521
1983.12 23085 24925.00 1986 12 91632,80
W ..............
SOURCE: Central Bank Statistical Bulletin
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TABLE II
Results of the Joint Estimation of the Forecasting Equations and
the Interest Rate Equation: January 1981-December 1986
Dependent Variable First Differences of the Nominal
91-Day Treasury Bill Rate
Forecasting Equations 5 Lags each of the logs of
include: monetized debt, government
expenditures, privately-held
debt, nominal exchange rate,
growth rate of the index of
industrial production, and
91-day Treasury Bill rate
_QAov.a#j.ons in the
Log of Log of Log of
Monetized Privately- Government
Constant p Debt Held Debt Expenditures
t1.184 0.92 -1.173 18.432 0.65
(8.853) (0.129) (1.941) (6.370) (0.281)
NOTE: In this and in succeeding Tables, the asymptotic
,
standard errors are in parenthesis, indicates
significance at the 5% level, indicates
significance at the I% level, p is the first-order
autocorrelation coefficient.
4 .
TABLE III
Results of the Joint Estimation of the Forecasting Equations and
theInterest Rate Equation: January 1981-December 1986
Dependent Variable First Differences of the
_eal Rate of Interest using the
91-Day Treasury Bill Rate
Forecasting Equations See Table I!
Inoovation in the
' Log of Log.of Log of
Monetized Privately- Government
Constant p Debt Held Debt Expenditures
9.621 0,895 0.519 34.411 ,0.526
(9.660) (0.204) (2.407) (12,!13) (0,378)
NOTE: .See Note in Table II.
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TABLE IV
Result _f ,the Joint Estimation of the. Forecasting ,Equations and
the In,re rest R_te Eq,_at!on: January 1981-December 1986
Dependent Variable First Differences of,tjhe Nominal
360-Day Tre_ury 8i l Rate
Forecasting Equatipns See Table • II
Innovatio_in the
Log of Log of Log of
,Monetized Privately- Government
Constant p Debt Held Debt Expenditures
2.5!1 0.463 1,066 5.997 0.180
(6,277) (0.761) (5.210) (12.324) (0,362)|
NOTE: See Note in Table II.
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TABLE V
Result of the Joint Estimation of the Forecasting Equation8 and
the Interest Rate Equation" January 1981-December 1986
Dependent Variable First Differences of the
Real Rate of Interest Using the
360-Day Treasury Bill Rate
Forecasting Equations See Table II
I n novatj_qn_i n the
Log of Log of . Log of
Monetized Privately- G_vernment
Constant P Debt Held Debt Expenditures
2.339 0.392 -0.540 1,669 0,172
i
(5,413)" (0,694) (4,987) (15,316) (0.311)
NOTE,: See Note in Table I[, The estimates did not converge
despite the use of a tuning option in the computer procedure,
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TABLE VI
Result of the Joint Estimation of the Forecasting Equations and
the Interest Rate Equation" January 1981-December 1986
Dependent .Variable First Differences of the Nominal
-91-day Treasury Bill Rate
Forecasting Equations 10 lags of the growth rate of
monetized debt, privately-held
debt, and government expenditures
Innovation in the
Log of Log of Log of
Monetized Privately- Government
,Constant p Debt Held Debt Expenditures
-0.060 -0.020 31.866 2.853 -6.270
(1.145) (0.443) (13.602) (2.912) (4.629)
.NOTE- See Note in Table If.
91 DAY TREASURY BILL RATE
I1981.01 TO 198;6.12 _ •
50
4O
3O
I-'.
Oq
20
_p
IL <
!
10
0
-10
--20
1981.01 1981.12 1982.12 1983.12 1984.12 1985.12 1986.12
PERIOD
[3 TB-91 + TB-91 (let D_ff)
360-DAY. TREASURY BILL RATE.
1981.91 TO 1986.12
50 ,.
40-
l;
I_ •
OQ
20-
M <!
10 =
o..... ..... ..... .....1
-10 -
-20 Illl III iitllt"l 11111111 11 I i I i i ill iliill I." IIIii I1111 Ililllil Iiil'l ill iiii
1981.01 1081.12 1982.12 1983.12 1984.12 1985,12 19t.12
60
•References
Aschauer, David Alan. "Fiscal Policy and Aggregate Demand."
American Economic Review, 75, March 1985, 117-128.
Barro, Robert J. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?"
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1974, 1095-1117.
"Federal Deficit Policy and the Effects of
Public Debt Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 12, no. 4, 1980, 747-762.
"Fiscal Policy and Consumer Behavior."
The Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1979, 317-
323.
"The Impact of Social Security on Private
Saving-Evidence from the U.S. Time Series. American
Enterprise Institute, 1978.
Calvo, Guillermo A. "Macroeconomic Implications of the
Government Budget - Some Basic Considerations." Journal
of Monetary Economics 1985, 95-112.
Cho, Yoon Je. "Inefficiencies from Financial Liberalization
in the Absence of Well-Functioning Equity Markets."
Journal of Money, Credit an_ Banking, 18 No. 2, 1986,
191-199.
COX, Michael W. "What is the Rule for Financing Public
Debt?" FRB Oallas Economic Review, September 1984,
25-31
Djajic, Slobodan. "Effects of Budgetary Policies in Open
Economies: The Role of Intertemporal Consumption
Substitution." Unpublished paper, Columbia University,
1986.
Evans, Paul. "Do Budget Deficits Raise Nominal Interest
Rates?" Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, 1987, 281-
300.
Feldstein, Martin. "Government Deficits and Aggregate
Demand. " Journal of Monetary Economics, 1982.
Huang, Roger D. "Does Monetization of Federal Debt Matter?
Evidence from the Financial Markets." Journal of Money
Credit, and Banking 18, no. 3, 1986, 275-289.
Kochin, Levis A. "Are future Taxes Anticipated by Consumers?
A Comment." Jout'nal of Money Credit, and Banking 6,
1974, 385-394.
61
Kormendi, Roger, "Government Debt, Government Spending, and
Private Sector Behavior." American Economz_Review 73,
December 1983, 994-1010.
McKinnon, Ronald I. and Donal J. Mathieson. "How to Manage a
Repressed Economy." Essays in International Finance,
Princeton University, No. 145, December 1981.
Mishkin, Frederic S. A Rational Expectations Approach to
Hacroeconometrics: Testing Policy Ineffectiveness and
Efficient Harkets Models. Chicago, NBER, 1983.
Munne]l, Alicia. The Effect of Social Security on Personal
Saving. Cambridge, Mass.: Bal]inger, 1974.
Plosser, Charles I. "Government Financing Decisions and
Asset Returns." Journal of Honetary Economies 1982,
326-352.
Remolona, Eli H. "Financing the Budget Deficit in the
Philippines," PZDS Working Paper No. B5-02.
Seater, J_hn J. and Roberto S. Mariano. "New Tests of the
Life Cycle and Tax Discounting Hypotheses." Journal of
Monetary Economies 15, March 1985, 195-215.
Tanner, J. Ernest. "Empirical Evidence on the Short Run
Real Balance Effect in Canada."3ournal of Money
Credit, and Banking, November 1970, 473-485.
"An Empirical Investigation of Tax Discounting:
A Comment." Journal of Honey Credit, and Banking, 11,
May 1979, 214-218.
"Fiscal Policy and consumer Behavior." The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2, May 1979, 317-
323.
Vandaele, Walter. Applied Time Series and_Box-Jenkins
Models. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1983.
APPENDIXA.I
RATIOFINT_RE_T A_N.TS
TOTHEqEFIC_T class boundaries,fEeq_ency:(f i) cum.fr_. (Fi) tal]y; ,_:
-2.551to -1,027 3 3 ///
-I.027 too.soT 7 10 ///////:
Year 1.041:to3,575 6 .2.i,JIdlll'.
and _ 3,575to5.109 5 29 /////
Quarter 5,109to8,643 3. .3.2 ///
......................... 32
!979,1 0,1715 ,
1979.2 -1,551 ................................ : .................. _#-._... ......
1979,3 -0,544
1979,4 -2,337 sod, deviation ;, 2:,,te72385051
1990,1 1,746 ,....
19_0,2 -2,551 (n+ll/4 : 8,25 QI class : -!.027 to 0,507
 98o.3 2.I55
1980.4 .,_,638 [(n+t)/i],+-,F
1981,1 3.7_7 ,-:_1
!981.2 3.940 QI: ! + c = ....................: -I,027+ Ill534l[(8.'25--3)/7]
19_1,3 5,418, Q1 _f,
!981,4 _6,642 Q1
!992,1 4.882 ,, i :
!982,2 3,773 Q1 : 0,1235
!982,3 .5.227
1982,4 2_328 ,
1983.1 "0,975 3t[(n+l)/4] : 24,7 Q3class: 3,575Eo to 5,109
1983.2 1,258
19_3,3 0,645 3,[(n+1)/4t _,F
1983,4 2,7t3 :, Q3
1984,1 2,143 Q3= 1 + c t ...................... : 3,575+ 1,534[(2475-24)/_I
!984.2 -0.148 Q3 f
1954,3 0,32.1 : Q3,,
1984,4 i,581
1985.1 0.290 Q3 : 3,8051
1985.2 0.397
1985,3 0,779 InterquartileRange: Q3- Ol : 3,6816
!985.4 2.396
1985,I 1,595
1986.2 -0,177 pseudo-std,devn,=2.7271111111
1986.3 1.124
1986,4 3,123 differencebet. hist. std,devn,andpseudo-std.devn,= 0.559872
outlying valuesof 6 :
lowerbound: -5,3989
upperbound: 9.3275
ave, valueof _: •1.7403619609
r1++mP:. +I
MONTHLY,danuar_9_!j!-_,D_b_ :;t.9_I_:
CLASSBOUNDARIES FREQUENCY(fi) TALLY CUM,FREQ.(Fi)
=.;.................................................................
-4,88o9 25to-2,384858o
-2.3848580_;o 0.1116165 14 \\\iX_\\\\\\\\ 17
?. .[_, ,, o
0. 1118185::Io,.,'!._0;78910 :29 [!\;\\\ \ \ \\ \\\ \ \\\ \\ \\\\ _\_.\t_\: ..:_8
£
5.Io41655::_o_.:g(/p_Oo.. ... :9 :,:N,\_\\\\\\ 68
• 7.6004400)OIQ,0_671i0 '_I X: 69
I ' :-:" ' '
n ; no, of_.:obscr,watjons 72
k no. of (;:las_es,:;l,
. ..ra_e.:; k_ghest,value- J._we_,a_:a_lue. % _!,.,,• , , ,_<. , ,,,.,
•__:.i-.;,",-.............-"-'--" " """
•:0 1,I,!_165_q 2.607891Q C]BSS.:.,....
1
Q _]a_s::_,:_9I"_o.-:5,Io4_855
.3
F 1'_ ...... :
I 3 ...............
.}
ave. v, lue:;o]f.:i,:,..d,_ _!34259...
f:
histor]cai..:s;O.::O_yidtionofd: !!.!99944
(_
_seudo-s_d.evn.. 3.001015
out]yin9valuesofd:
lowerbound: -5,8412428
u_perbound: I0.5_4241
64
RATIO OF BUDGET DEFICIT
TO INTEREST PAYMENTS
Monthly, 1981 - 1986
Period ._ Period : " _
1981 01 -4 880932 1984 01 -3 440130
1981 02 12 592990 1984 02 3 911058
1981 03 2 323458 1984 03 3 787376
1981 04 -0 216155 1984 04 -0 246377
1981 05 11 480660 1984 05 -0 798316
1981 06 3 826011 1984 06 0 268519
1981 07 6 662032 1984 07 -2 861563
1981 08 7 1.90821 1984 08 0 700893
1981 09 3 839429 1984 09 1 888350
1981 10 7 203055 1984 10 1' 001708
1981 11 5 578358 1984.11 0 989583
1981 12 6 002564 1984.12 2 265650
1982 01 0 905904 1985.01 -0 637838
1982.:02 5 126977 1985.02 2 130137
1982 03 8 814388 1985.'03 -0 325792
1982 04 0 038844 1985".04 0.024790
1982 05 11 080910 1985.05 0.577064
1982 06 4 086339 1985.06 0 878412
1982 07 4.265373 1985.07 -0 006375
1982 08 5.527750 1985.'08 3 23'4823
1982 09 6.037118 1985.09 -0 784146
1982 10 1,145547 1985,10 -0 989183
1982 11 2.408244 1985,.11 1 269448
1982 12 2 937626 1985 12 6 237664
1983 01 0 184416 1986 01 3 417486
1983 02 1 862687 1986 02 2 268169
1983 03 0 992228 1986 03 0 903810
1983 04 0 306931 1986 04 -0 915778
1983 05 3 577670 1986 05 0 646519
1983 06 1 793956 1986 06 0 00541.8
1983 07 0.060172 1986 07 0 548356
1983 08 1.455189 1986 08 2 022746
1983 09 0.258333 1986 09 0 755747
1983 10 0.042714 1986 10 2 748046
1983 11 0.977337 1986 11 2 328745
1983 12 5,010974 1986 12 3 761747
65
APP_DIX A.III
SMPL 1979.2 - 1986.4
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Appendix B
Results of the Likelihood Ratio TestS, on the Validity of
the,Cross-Equation Constraints
2
Table I : Likelihood • ratio statistic: X (93) = 2.8292?528
Marginal significance level: 0.010719
2
Table II : Likelihood ratio statistic: X (93) = 0.752412528
Marginal significance level: 0.010719
Table III : Likelihood ratio sta%is,tic: _ (93) = *
2
Table IV : Likelihood ratlo statistic: X (93) = 0.200342304
Marginal significance level 0.010719
,2
Table V : Likelihood ratio statistic: X (93) = *
.NOTE: Marginal significance level is the probability of
getting that value of the likelihood ratio statistic or
higher under the null hypothesis.
* 2
The X statistic was negative.
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APPENDIXC
LISTOFVARIABLES,
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION PERIOD UNIT SOURCE
CB Holdingsof OutstandingGov'tSecurities 1981m19aB million P CentralBank
-- bythe CentralBank (monthly)
REQREB RequiredReserves .1981-1986 million,P CentralBank
--DepositMoneyBanks,Thrift Banks, (monthly)
SpecializedGov't Banks
DOM, Holdingsof Outstandin9Gov'tSecurities 1981-1986 million P CentralBank
-- by the domesticsector (monthly)
(CommercialBanks,SavingsandOtherBanks, :: :
TrustBanks,Semi-Gov'tEntities,Private)
FOR ,,. Holdingsof OutstandingGov'tSecurities 1981-1986 million P Cen_ra.l,Bank
-- by the foreign sector (monthly)
TREGS Reserve-EligibleSecurities
--DepositHoneyBanks,ThriftBanks, 1981-1986 millionP CentralBank
Specializedlov'tBanks (monthly)
MC MoneyCreation 1981-1986 generated
= CB- REQRES (monthly)
PD Publicly*heldDebt _ 1981-1986 " generated
: (DOM+ FOR)- TREGS (monthly
GE GovernmentExpenditures 1981-1986 millionP Bureauofthe
(monthly Treasury
TB91n 91-dayTreasuryBillRates 1981-1988 percent/ CentralBank
(nominal,end-of-month) (monthly annum
TB360N 3BO-dayTreasuryBillRates 1981-1986 percent/ CentralBank
(nominal,average)/* (monthly annum
ER ExchangeRate 1981-1986 PIUS$ FarEastern
(end-of-month) (monthly EconomicReview
PRODN IndexoftheValueofProduction 1981-1986 1985:I00 Industry)rends
(monthly (NEDA)
CPI ConsumerP iceIndex 1981-1986 1978=I00 CentralBank
(monthly
Note:Alldataarefortheendofthemonth.
/*Point-in-Limedataforthe360-dayT-Billratearenotavailable.
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